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Abstract: Henry Clay is rightly regarded as the most significant personality in the antebellum
House of Representatives.  Still, there is dispute about whether Clay’s genius was primarily as a
legislative tactician (working to manipulate an established set of rules) or architect (working to
change the rules).  This essay makes the case for Clay’s position as the preeminent tactician of his
day, rather than architect.  On the way to making this argument I first examine the difficulties of
making any firm empirical claims about the role of Clay in the institutional development of the
House.  I then explore three important cases in which Clay played an active role in policymaking
through the use of institutional tools at his disposal—declaration of war against England, the
evolution of the House committee system, and the passage of the two Missouri compromises.
Some of the research in this paper was conducted in collaboration with Jeffrey A. Jenkins of
Michigan State University.
1Clay’s first congressional service came as he twice filled unexpired Senate
terms—between November 19, 1806 and March 3, 1807 and January 4, 1810 and March 3, 1811. 
He served in the House in the 12th Congress and part of the 13th.  Clay resigned in the 13th
Congress to be part of the American delegation to negotiate a peace treaty with England.  Clay
returned to the House in the 14th Congress and served until the 16th.  He returned again to the
House in the 18th Congress.  After serving as Secretary of States from 1825 to 1829, he served
two terms in the Senate, from 1831 to 1842 and 1849 to until his death in 1852.  Clay was
Speaker of the House throughout his House service, except for the second session of the 16th
Congress.
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I.  Introduction
Henry Clay is widely regarded to be the most significant personality in the antebellum House of
Representatives.  He is the only pre-Civil War Speaker to be subjected to major biographies, and
the only Speaker whom each generation of American historians feels compelled to reexamine
(Schurz 1898; Clay 1910; Mayo 1937; Van Deusen 1937; Eaton 1957; Peterson 1987; Remini
1991).  To students of congressional history, Clay is most importantly remembered for
transforming the office of Speaker into a partisan one.  Mary Parker Follett wrote
As a presiding officer Clay from the first showed that he considered himself not the
umpire, but the leader of the House: his object was clearly and expressly to govern
the House as far as possible.  In this he succeeded to an extent never before or
since equalled [sic] by a Speaker of the House of Representatives.  Clay was the
boldest of Speakers.  He made no attempt to disguise the fact that he was a
political officer.  (Follett 1896, pp. 71–72)
As historians have reviewed the life of Henry Clay and reflected on his time in the House,1
two themes have emerged to organize these assessments.  The first concerns Clay’s personality
and general political skills. Like many “great men” in American history, he was larger than life. 
Clay received a first-rate legal education in his youth in Richmond, was a part of the considerable
22Clay coined the phrase “self-made man” to describe the trajectory from his supposedly
humble beginnings to his rise to fame.  Remini (1991, chap. 1) thoroughly demolishes Clay’s
claims about his humble upbringing and early education.
3An under-appreciated function of early representatives and senators was their
moonlighting as private attorneys for back-home commercial interests in their dealings with the
federal courts sitting in Washington. Clay, himself, was an active participant in the Washington
bar, and it is claimed that his two early terms in the Senate came about because Kentucky business
leaders wished to have him in Washington pleading their court cases.  The classic case of legal
moonlighting during this period was Daniel Webster, who apparently was willing to obtain legal
retainers in exchange for legislative favors (Josephy 1979; Baker 1985; Peterson 1987; Stewart
1994).  Nor were Clay and Webster alone: Roughly 80% of senators and 55% of House members
in the 1820s were lawyers (Stewart 1994, Fig. 1), compared to 54% of the Senate and 39% of the
House in the104th Congress (Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 1996).
high legal society of that city in the late 1700s, and then set out to seek his fortune in Lexington,
Kentucky.  With the raw Western frontier as his political base, he combined a well-honed legal
intelligence with a cagey myth about humble frontier beginnings to craft a political persona that
allowed him to navigate deftly the political worlds he encountered.2 
His rough-hewn personality served him well with his frontier constituents.  His legal
training and acumen made Clay a natural legal advocate on behalf of the western commercial
classes who also needed representation of their legal interests with the federal government in
Washington.3  Clay’s outgoing personality and joie e vivre put him on the “A List” of
Washington society and earned him a reputation as quite a lady’s man.  This combination of
attributes served him well not only in American politics, but in his international dealings, as well,
where his hobnobbing with royalty during negotiations for the Treaty of Ghent earned him the
nickname “Prince Hal.”
Taking all his personality together, the best modern analogy to draw is between Clay and
Lyndon Johnson.  Like Johnson a century and a half later, Clay was an exceptional student of
34Richard Russell’s famous statement about Johnson seems aptly applied to Clay, too:
He doesn’t have the best mind on the Democratic side of the Senate; he isn’t the
best orator; he isn’t the best parliamentarian.  But he’s the best combination of all
those qualities.  (Quoted in Evans and Novak 1966)
others’ motives, an expert manipulator of existing parliamentary forms, and willing to use either
quiet persuasion or fiery bluster, where appropriate, to get his way.4
The second theme that emerges in scholarship about Clay’s House experience is his role as
an institutional innovator and tactician.  No doubt betraying their professional proclivities,
political scientists have tended to emphasize his institutional innovations, while historians have
tended to emphasize his tactics.  The earliest appreciation for Clay’s role as an institutional
innovator came from Harlow (1917, pp. 199–219).  Binder’s recent research systematically
confirm’s Harlow’s characterization of Clay, by demonstrating convincingly that the adoption of
the previous question motion by the House in 1811 was a Clay-led effort at “choosing war and
choosing rules” (Binder 1997, pp. 58–60)
Another institutional stream flowing within political science has focused more specifically
on committee development than on rules of debate and floor procedure.  Gamm and Shepsle
(1989) argued that Clay’s desire to keep together his fragile War Hawk coalition after the War of
1812 prompted Clay to innovate in the use of standing committees as a tool for keeping his
coalition together.  This argument is amplified by Jenkins (1998), who maintains that Clay’s
manipulation of the House committee system in the early 1820s was a result of his vying for
advantage in the upcoming presidential election of 1824.  Strahan et al (1998) argue for a more
complex understanding of Clay’s committee appointment strategies, but they nonetheless consider
the committees the primary source of Clay’s strategic maneuvering once the war was over.
4Of Clay as a skilled legislative tactician, many stories abound.  Some of Clay’s tactics
amount to an implementation of grand strategy.  The best-known case of Clay as a grand
strategist concerns his leading the House to declare War on England in 1812.  Getting the House
to this point of declaring war necessitated his stacking the committee system with War Hawk
supporters, buying-off pivotal old-line Republicans (like former-Speaker Nathaniel Macon) with
attractive committee assignments, and then commanding the House floor so that the renegade
John Randolph could not filibuster the Clay-stacked legislative process from doing its will (Remini
1991, pp. 78–80; Fritz 1977).  
In other cases, Clay’s quick wits cemented important legislative victories.  An important
example of this came at the end of legislative proceedings on the “first” Missouri Compromise in
1820.  Having secured passage by the House of a bill providing for the conditional admission of
Missouri to the Union, John Randolph moved reconsideration of the vote (Annals, 16-2, pp.
1588-90; Remini 1991, p. 184).  Clay, noting the lateness of the hour, asked Randolph to
postpone his motion until the next day.  On the following day, when Randolph rose to make his
reconsideration motion, Clay ruled that Randolph had to wait until morning business was finished. 
In the intervening hour or so, Clay signed the house-passed version of the compromise and a clerk
spirited it away to the Senate.  Upon renewing his motion and learning of Clay’s actions,
Randolph’s tirade was interrupted by a messenger from the Senate announcing that the upper
chamber had agreed to the House’s plan.
It is indisputable that Clay was the legislative personality in the antebellum House of
Representatives.  Yet an important question remains about how best to partition this dominance
between his skills as a legislative tactician and his skills as an institutional architect.  In making
5this distinction between Clay as tactician and architect, I am distinguishing between two general
lines of attack that a leader such as Clay can use to achieve his goals.  Basically, he could take the
rules as given, using them to his advantage by creative manipulation (tactician), or he could
change the rules, not only allowing short-term political victory, but also helping to perpetuate
those victories into the future (architect).  As tactician, he had a range of options at his disposal,
such as “stacking” committees to his liking and using the Speaker’s right of recognition to control
the direction of floor action.  As architect his range of options was more limited, involving
essentially the formal amendment of the House’s rules.
Within the confines of a single paper, it is impossible to assign credit to Clay’s
architectural and tactical sides once and for all.  Indeed, as I will argue, it is unlikely that the
evidence will ever exist to bring cloture to this issue.  Yet attempting to address these questions is
an important undertaking, and not simply a semantic exercise, for at least three reasons.  
First, for students of Congress, it is important to understand the mix of motives and
conditions that have given rise to the organizational form of the most capable legislature on earth. 
The “Clay era” coincides with the earliest congealing of the core congressional structures,
especially committees, that undergirded its power in the American political system.  
Second, for historians of the antebellum period, attending to the institutional development
of the House helps to provide needed balance in understanding how the perilous politics leading
up to the Civil War unfolded.  Histories of this period, when they have taken an institutional focus
at all, have tended to rest their gaze on the Senate (where the north-south balance was
institutionalized), the Supreme Court (which produced the infamous Dr dd Scott decision), and
the presidency (which was became a focus of party and electoral politics).  Yet it was the House,
6apportioned by population and elected popularly, where the fast-growing industrial North held its
greatest strength and the careful regional balances maintained in the other institutions were so
easily upset.
Third and finally, scholars in the field of American Political Development are deeply
concerned with the tradeoff between individual agency and determinism in understanding how
American politics unfolds (see, for example, Skowronek 1993).  America is, after all, a “nation of
laws, not of men,” suggesting that its politicians act within a fairly confining set of institutional
boundaries.  At the same time, through an exercise of sheer will or extraordinary persuasiveness,
particular historical moments may conspire to allow well-positioned individuals to lead to the
transformation of politics despite those institutional boundaries.  Since Clay found himself at most
of the critical junctions of pre-Civil War American politics, a study of how Clay moved between
the worlds of architect and tactician provides a glimpse into how agency and determinism
interacted during an important era of American history.
The rest of this paper provides a glimpse into how one would approach the role of Henry
Clay in the House’s early institutional development by focusing on three well-known episodes in
Clay’s House career—first, the declaration of war against England in 1812, second, the
transformation of the House committee system from select- to standing-committee-dominated,
and third, the passage of the first and second Missouri Compromises in 1820 and 1821.  These
cases are explored, respectively, in Sections III, IV, and V.  Preceding these cases, I examine the
empirical difficulties that are inherent when political scientists take on such an task.  That is
Section II.  Section VI provides a discussion and conclusion.
75The Annals of Congress, which is the report of congressional debates until 1824, was not
based on live reporting on the House floor.  Rather, Gales and Seaton used newspapers and other
contemporary sources to created a retrospective debate record of Congress.  Their Register of
Debates was a contemporaneous reporting of congressional debates, covering 1824 to 1837.  The
Congressional Globe gan publication in 1833, beginning the practice of first-person accounts of
verbatim congressional activities.  The Congr ssional Record began publication in 1873.  See
National Archives 1989a, p. 13.
II.  Henry Clay and the Problem of Evidence
Even if students of Congress do not know from first-hand experience how difficult it is to
assemble evidence when researching political history, they can probably intuit that the chasm of
time separating 1998 from 1812 is vast and that the instruments available to bridge the gap are
crude.  Doing modern research is hard, too.  Equivalent historical research is just harder.  For
every modern social science technique, there is an unsatisfying historical analogue.  Moderns can
rely on interviews; historians rely on diaries and letters.  Modern congressional students readily
peruse newspapers (New York Times, Washington Post, e c.) and specialized publications (CQ
Weekly Report, Roll Call, etc.).  Historians can also use newspapers and specialized publications
(Nile’s Weekly Register), too, but access to them is limited and indexing is even worse.  The
business of the modern Congress is recorded verbatim (plus or minus some redaction) in the
Congressional Record and televised via C-SPAN.  The earlier Congress was also reported, though
not verbatim, and not always by congressional-employed reporters.5  Once a s s ion is completed,
original documents and records are available for research at the National Archives.  Older records
are available, too, but much more sketchily (See National Archives 1987a and 1987b).  The class
of evidence that is most comparable across time is the roll call record, which has been put to
creative use by scholars such as Poole and Rosenthal (1997).  Even here the evidence is shakier in
86To provide just one measure of the relative richness of the roll call record now compared
to the early 1800s, consider the following: In the 104th Congress, the Senate engaged in 919  roll
calls, the House, 1,310.  This is roughly the same total number of roll calls held in the first ten
Congresses combined.
7See Hay (1988) for a critical review Clay biographical sources.
past years, due to the paucity of roll call votes, particularly at the amendment stage, before the
onset of recorded teller votes in Committee of the Whole in 1973.6
Moving back in time, it grows increasingly difficult to acquire high-quality and reliable
evidence about congressional behavior in general, since the general sources such as newspapers
and congressional records grow spotty, even when well-preserved.  Evidence about individual
legislators does not grow monotonically worse, however, since significant effort has gone into
preserving the records of prominent individuals who participated in formative historical moments. 
Thus, acquiring evidence about the activities of the most prominent legislators, such as Henry
Clay, John C. Calhoun, and Daniel Webster, is orders of magnitude easier than acquiring the same
evidence about the average House members in the 1810s and 1820s.  
All is not rosy,  however.  In the particular case of Henry Clay, for instance, the primary
documentary evidence is uneven.7  Th  historiography of Clay was not created with the
institutional development of the House high on the priority list.  Students of American history are
mostly interested in Clay for two reasons.  First, he was Speaker who led the nation into the War
of 1812.  Second, later in his life he was one of the nation’s most prominent politicians.  Clay was
the Harold Stassen of anebellum America.  He was also a pivotal player in the stories of regional
crisis until his death in 1852.  He was, after all, one-third of the “Great Triumvirate,” along with
98Material from Clay's speakership is contained in the first three volumes of his Papers, plus
a small amount of material in the fourth volume and the supplement.  The correspondence in
Clay's Papers mostly address his business affairs and law practice, plus the national political
Daniel Webster and John C. Calhoun, who so dominated American politics for nearly half a
century.
Unfortunately, students of American history have been much more interested in Clay for
the latter part of his official life than the early part.  Of his speakership, scholars tend to be much
more interested in the strategic maneuvers of the War Hawks or in the blow-by-blow unfolding of
the Missouri crisis than in the nitty-gritty work of how Clay might have behaved as an institutional
innovator.  Clay’s first serious biographer, Carl Schurz, spent 122 of his 797 pages on Clay’s
Speakership, focusing almost exclusively on Clay’s contribution to the War and to the Missouri
Compromise.  Remini’s recent 800-page biography of Clay spends only 83 pages on his
Speakership, attending to more of Clay’s foreign policy interests and his designs upon the
presidency.  Peterson’s (1987) collective biography of the Great Triumvirate contains even less
about Clay’s speakership: 6 pages.  All of these histories are primarily interested in painting a
portrait of Clay the tactician, not Clay the architect.  
Lest we blame historians for overlooking obvious material about Clay’s institutional
engineering, it is important to note that this imbalance starts with Clay himself.  Of the ten
thousand pages contained in the Papers of Henry Clay, only about fifteen hundred cover the
period when he was Speaker.  Most of that material pertains to his personal affairs, not to his
official duties.  Virtually all of the material that addresses his official acts was culled from 
published sources, particularly the National Intelligencer, so there are few fresh insights to be
gleaned about Clay's speakership from Clay's private correspondence.8
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climate, once his presidential ambitions had solidified.
Scholars trying to assess the role of Clay in either transforming or manipulating the House
as an institution have to contend with the historical inheritance from Clay’s biographers.  Looking
for a strong political figure on which to focus the story of the War of 1812, nineteenth century
historians lionized Clay for his decisiveness and cunning, particularly in light of the reluctant and
indecisive James Madison.  However, a major problem with telling a convincing story of Clay’s
decisive legislative hand during the war is that he left no clear fingerprints on the institution.  This
is the “no smoking gun problem” that Gamm and Shepsle (1989) refer to in constructing their
interpretation of Clay’s role in the development of the House committee system.  Neither
newspaper accounts (such as Niles’ Register o  the National Intelligencer) nor Clay’s papers
comment directly on his personal role in either developing the standing committee system or in
manipulating them, nor about his direct role in reforming the rules of floor debate.  Even reporters
in the House chamber were so lax in recording Clay’s speeches for posterity that Remini (1991)
has to reconstruct indirectly several of Clay’s most important speeches on the House floor by
using Clay’s opponents’ remarks in response to Clay.
We are sometimes left with the papers and remarks of Clay’s contemporaries to gain
insights into his actions and motivations.  Here we have to proceed with extreme caution.  For
instance, the best-informed and most prolific contemporary diarist was John Quincy Adams who,
while clearly respecting Clay’s abilities, mostly held him in personal contempt.
If we are to understand the significance of Clay’s House activities from the perspective of
contemporary political science, we need (1) a theoretical framework that allows us to put broad
historical claims about Clay’s behavior into some sort of tractable system (so that we might
11
generate hypotheses, null and maintained) and (2) strategies of measuring the variables we need to
test these hypotheses.  In the following three sections, I will suggest ways in which Clay’s
behavior, as specified by traditional historians, can be cast in contemporary political science terms. 
In each of those cases, it will be necessary to characterize carefully Clay’s preferences, the
preferences of those around him (inside and outside of the House), and the policy instruments he
was attempting to manipulate.  That is because all claims about Clay’s legislative/institutional
prowess can be reduced to claims that he was able to affect the quality of the policies chosen. 
Thus, we need some way of characterizing a counterfactual—what would have happened had
Clay not acted?—and of characterizing how Clay intended to perturb policy away from this
counterfactual.
Coming up with good quantitative measures of Clay’s goals and behavior as Speaker is
particularly vexing, for two reasons.  The first is because Clay was House Speaker virtually non-
stop from the moment he walked into the House chamber in 1811 until he left for the last time in
1825.  Except for the second session of the 16th Congress, when he was a (mostly absent) rank-
and-file member, Clay almost never took the opportunity to vote on the floor.  The one exception
was the fateful twelfth Congress, where Clay voted twelve times (out of a total of 314 roll calls). 
He voted only once in the 14th, 15th, and 17th Congresses, and never cast a recorded vote in the
13th (ICPSR Study # 0004).  There is consequently no reliable roll call record with which to
anchor more qualitative descriptions of Clay’s goals and behaviors while he was a House member.
Historians have been diligent about identifying the issues Clay cared about throughout his
career.  During the House years, those issues included war with England (of course), support for
internal improvements and a protective tariff (the embodiment of Clay’s “American System”),
12
moderate opposition to slavery restrictions, and support for American recognition of newly-
liberated Latin America.  
Historical research into Clay’s political endeavors has been useful to political scientists in
placing Clay’s behavior in broad political context.  Beyond that, though, the standard biographies
are not particularly useful for shining light where most political scientists are interested in looking. 
The first scholar to pick up on this was James Sterling Young (1966), who noted that although
Clay held an iron grip on the Speaker’s chair, he had a terrible batting average getting the House
to do his bidding once the War was underway.  Even more embarrassing is the fact that Clay
could not translate the virtually unanimous margins by which he was elected Speaker into a simple
majority of votes for president when the election of 1824 was thrown into the House of
Representatives, over which he presided.  But why was Clay so unsuccessful?  Was it because, as
Young speculated, Clay distributed committee assignments to members of too many
boardinghouse group?  Or was it something else?  Absent an equally rich analysis of the political
stances and skills of the other 708 House members Clay served along with, assessing the
significance of Clay’s poor legislative track record after 1813 and placing it alongside the heady
days of the 12th Congress was virtually impossible.
Research research by Strahan has revisited Young’s dismissal of Clay as an effective party
leaders after 1812 (Strahan 1994; Strahan, et al, 1998).  Using the accumulated historical record,
they have reconstructed Clay’s policy positions on important issues of the day, mapping those
positions onto roll calls, so that they can create “Clay support scores” for the rank-and-file House
members he led.  Based on this technique they discover that Clay was able to exercise strategic
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leadership on a limited range of issues, notably the tariff.  On issues where he just could not
prevail, he allocated committee resources simply to maintain his procedural majority.
Strahan’s research is an important step forward in more rigorously assessing the
independent contribution of Clay to House decisionmaking during his Speakership.  But, because
Clay took so few positions on contemporary political questions, compared to the total roll call
record he presided over, these Clay support scores must be particularly noisy.  It would be
preferable to map Strahan’s analysis onto more robust measures of House member preferences,
such as D-NOMINATE or Heckman-Snyder linear factor scores (Poole and Rosenthal 1997;
Heckman and Snyder 1997).  There, we run into a new problem, however.
In addition to the fact that we cannot directly calculate D-NOMINATE scores for Clay
during most of his House service, due to a lack of roll call votes, Clay’s House tenure also
perfectly coincides with the most “spatially chaotic” period of American history.  Prior to the 15th
Congress, the House and Senate can be easily arrayed along a single dimension, mostly on
account of attitudes toward beligerants in the Napoleonic conflicts (See Poole and Rosenthal
1997, chap. 3).  After the 18th Congress, a left-right structuring re-emerges, now based mostly on
attitudes toward federal government activism in the economy.  In the interim, the best-fitting
scalings still do not predict roll call votes very well.  For these Congresses of the transitional
era—the 16th, 17th, and 18th Congresses—the primary political cleavage was regional, reflecting
the anamosity stirred up by the Missouri controversy.  
Furthermore, while the research of Poole and Rosenthal reveals that legislators tend to
have stable preferences throughout their careers, the major exception is the Clay era, at least as
far as methods like NOMINATE are concerned.  An examination of graphs of estimated ideal
14
9Although the n’s are small in this table, the analysis is borne out in other more detailed
analysis that uses many more House members, though over shorter periods of time.  See Jenkins
and Stewart 1998.
points from consecutive Congresses during this period reveals that the space was “rotating,” with
representatives who had previously favored internal improvements and government activism (the
primary issue structuring the second dimension) moving “rightward” year-to-year, and those who
had previously opposed governmental activism in this realm moving “leftward” (see Jenkins and
Stewart 1998).
This rotation of the space is illustrated in Table 1, which reports D-NOMINATE scores
for a select few House members—those who had House service both before the 13th Congress
and after the 25th.9  Erstwhile Republicans who later became Whigs (such as Clay), were a
diverse lot before the 13th Congress, on average in the middle of the left-right space, but also
spanning the entire ideological spectrum.  Following the 25th Congress, those same House
members were somewhat more to the “right,” but more importantly, they had become
ideologically cohesive.  Republicans who later emerged as Democrats shifted a bit to the left,
while old line Federalists who eventually took on the Whig moniker moved even further (and
more cohesively) to the right.
Can we place Clay more precisely within this pattern of ideological migration?  The
qualitative historical record is consistent with the notion that Clay, himself  migrated across the
ideological map during this period.  He started off as an orthodox small-government Jeffersonian,
in the bosom raised, and ended his life the best-known antebellum Hamiltonian except, of course,
15
10It is ironic, on this score, that Clay’s first nationally-prominent legal client was
Hamilton’s murderer, Aaron Burr.
for Hamilton.10  The sketchy D-NOMINATE record we have is also consistent with this
movement.  In Figure 1, I have graphed out the spatial locations of Clay that we can be confident
of, based on separate analysis of his House voting behavior in the 16th Congress and his Senate
voting behavior beginning in the 22nd Congress.  Clay’s late-career House spatial location is in
the middle of the ideological space, indicated by the single solid circle in the middle of the figure. 
By the time he had acquired a Senate roll call record in the 22nd Congress, he had clearly taken
up residence on the right, which is indicated by the several open circles trending downward on the
right.
It might be possible to fill in this measure of Clay’s ideological positioning through a deft
combination of historical analysis and quantitative research.  For instance, support for declaring
war against England is almost perfectly predicted by first dimensional D-NOMINATE scores in
the 12th Congress.  Thus, would be safe to place Clay somewhere in the far left of the issue space
for that Congress.  Regression of Strahan’s Clay Support Scores on the first two dimensions of
the D-NOMINATE scores reveals that in the interim Congresses, Clay’s strongest supporters
tended to be in the northwest quadrant of the ideological space, which is what we would expect if
Clay were traversing the space from left-to-right.
Thus, surveying both qualitative and quantitative data, the best we can say about Henry
Clay is that he was an ideological and political moving target for all of his House career.  That
makes drawing general conclusions about Clay’s behavior during this years dicey.  Nonetheless, it
may be possible to inquire into Clay’s motivates and behavior at particular times in congressional
16
history.  In the following sections I turn my attention to the integration of qualitative and
quantitative data about Clay, his followers, and the policy environment at important moments in
Clay’s House career in an attempt to build a general conclusion about Clay’s legacy from the
ground-up.
III.  Clay and the War Hawks
Scholars trying to assess the role that Clay himself played in bringing the nation to war against
England face the same problems that any scholars face in assessing the independent role of “great
men” in times of crisis.  Crises tend to focus the attention of scholars on the principal dramatis
personae.  The danger of this type of selective attention, of course, is that it may blind us to the
pursuit of similar strategies by leaders in less crisis-filled times.  In the case of Clay, for instance,
his attention to using the House rules to pursue his policy ends has been regarded as precedent-
setting by his biographers.  Yet Clay was not the first avowedly partisan Speaker.  Theodore
Sedgwick (6th Cong., 1799–1801) claims that prize, for his attempts to use the Speaker’s
prerogatives to serve majoritarian ends.  Follett notes that Sedgwick “made many enemies by
decided and even partisan acts. . . .  So great was the feeling against him that the customary vote
of thanks at the end of Congress recorded the names only of his party associates.” (Follett, 1896,
pp.  67–68)
What were Clay’s parliamentary tactics as Speaker in the Twelfth Congress?  Which were
architectural?  Which tactical?  What were their effects?  Harlow (1896, p. 219) claimed that “the
man who made the speakership was concerned primarily with improvements in the methods of
transacting business, and it is in this field that Clay made his great contributions.”  Recently
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Binder (1997), though her quantitative study of minority procedural rights in the House, has
confirmed Harlow’s claims about Clay’s attentiveness to expediting the House’s business.
The best measures of legislative pace that we can construct confirm Harlow’s and
Binder’s conclusions.  I say the “best measures . . . we can construct” because it is impossible to
reconstruct Committee of the Whole proceedings in the House—where most legislative work was
actually done—with any accuracy in the Twelfth Congress.  We are left, therefore, with the
records of the formal House proceedings, about which there are no reliable, contemporaneous
verbatim accounts.  However, one indirect measure of legislative delay is simply the number of
recorded roll call votes on the floor, both the number in general and the number associated with
parliamentary maneuvers.  To test whether Clay was successful in putting down dilatory tactics in
the 12th Congress, I examine both the total number of roll call votes in the House and the fraction
of roll calls that were held on the question of adjourning the House.
Figure 2 graphs out these two time series from the First to Thirty-second Congresses
(1789 to 1853).  The total number of roll call votes had been increasing secularly from the First
Congress, free-falling in the Twelfth.  Adjournment roll calls had been rare until the Eleventh
Congress, when it became a motion frequently made by Federalists to bottle up consideration of
measures intended to show contempt or resolve toward England.  Such roll call votes again
became relatively infrequent in the Twelfth Congress.  Both time series began to march upward
following Clay’s departure from the House, reaching new-record levels once regional animosities
began to boil again toward mid-century.
The other tactic Clay reportedly employed to his advantage as Speaker was the
manipulation of the House committee system.  One manifestation of this manipulation was his
18
11The one majority exception is Hatzenbuehler (1972; 1976). 
stacking House committees with War Hawks in the 12th Congress, which I will examine here. 
The other manifestation, his willingness to expand the range of the standing committee system to
bolster his political support, will be examined in the next section.
Remini (1991, p. 80) writes that upon ascending to the Speaker’s chair, 
In a bold and determined move he started off by assigning all the War Hawks to
the important committees, and he saw to it that they held control of each one. 
Peter B. Porter, a House veteran of two years, was named to head the Committee
on Foreign Relations.  Clay also assigned Calhoun, Harper, Joseph Desha, and
Grundy to that committee.
In documenting Clay’s “stacking” of the Foreign Affairs Committee, most historians rely
on an identification of “War Hawks”—Clay’s anti-English ideological cadre—that derives its
lineage from John Randolph’s attack on pro-war Republicans.  Since Randolph was by far the
most outrageous member of the small band of “quids” who clung to the most conservative
principles of Jeffersonianism, one should take with a grain of salt Randolph’s attempts at
ideological scaling (Cunningham 1963; Carson 1986).  Furthermore, upon surveying the historical
literature, it appears that identification of the War Hawks is largely inferred from the institutional
position of people like Porter, Harper, and Desha, making the whole business of assessing Clay’s
behavior prone to tautology.11  Because Clay was such a skilled parliamentary manipulator, he
certainly would not appoint people to the critical Foreign Affairs committee who were not
ideological soul mates.  Hence if Porter, for example, was appointed to chair this committee, he
certainly must have been in the pocket of Clay.  Conversely, anyone who did not bear the stigmata
of being a War Hawk—principally being a freshman from the West or South—must not have been
19
12Throughout this paper, I rely on committee data drawn from the committee rosters in
Cannon and Stewart (1996, 1997).  The Poole-Rosenthal D-NOMINATE scores used in this
paper were downloaded from Keith Poole’s web site, URL http://k7moa.gsia.cmu.edu/dwnl.htm.  
On the NOMINATE methodology generally, see Poole and Rosenthal (1997).
Even though Poole and Rosenthal (1997) note that their technique does not do especially
well in classifying votes during the 1810s, the first dimensional D-NOMINATE scores do an
excellent job in explaining whether House members voted for or against declaring war with
England.  Therefore, I interpret these scores as tapping anti-English sentiment during the early
1810s.  
an ideological true believer, and therefore does not count as evidence of Clay’s stacking of
Foreign Affairs.
Fortunately, social scientists have made tremendous strides over the past decade,
empirically and theoretically, in developing ways to assess whether committees are “stacked” in
non-majoritarian ways.  Taking a cue from Keith Krehbiel’s (1991; 1993) recent critique of the
“outlier” view of congressional committees, a committee should be called stacked only if it is
actually composed of members who have atypical preferences with respect to the whole chamber. 
Relying on the empirical work of Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal (1997) and their
D-NOMINATE scores, we have one objective measure of the underlying preferences of House
members in the Twelfth Congress.  Was Clay’s Foreign Affairs Committee composed of outlying
fire-breathers?
Yes and No.  We begin to graphically illustrate this point using the first dimensional
Poole-Rosenthal scores, comparing the distribution of ideal points among committee members
with that of the whole House.12  (See Figure 3.)  Using these scores, we see that Clay appointed a
majority of Foreign Affairs Committee members from among the anti-English side of the
Republican party.  Note that three committee Republicans are virtually on top of each other in the
figure.  These three members constituted the median of the committee.  They occupied a position
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13The House had a select committee on Foreign Affairs each session of both Congresses. 
The Senate had no single Foreign Affairs committee in the first session of the Eleventh
Congress—legislative items were dispersed among several select committees.  In the second
session of the Eleventh Congress the Senate appointed a select committee to “Consider relations
with Great Britain and France.”  A select committee by the same name was appointed again in the
third session and in the first session of the Twelfth Congress.  In the second session of the Twelfth
Congress the Senate appointed a select committee on “Relations with Great Britain and te
Military Establishment.”
close to the most anti-English quartile of the Republican party.  Thus, it is fair to say that the
Foreign Affairs Committee, which bore the responsibility of reporting most of the legislation
leading up to the War, was more anti-English than even the majority of Republicans.
Clay’s tactic of stacking the Foreign Affairs Committee with anti-English House members
is put into context if we widen our focus a bit, peering back to the Eleventh Congress, when
belligerent rhetoric was heating up, and comparing House behavior with the Senate—which is
where Clay had first observed deadlock over relations with England.  I do this in Figure 4 by
examining D-NOMINATE scores in the two chambers for both the Eleventh and Twelfth
Congresses—both the scores of the chambers themselves and the scores of the two chambers’
committees on Foreign Affairs.13
The first thing to note in Figure 4 is that I have indicated where the two parties’ members
were ideologically located using a series of boxes.  The boxes themselves indicate the location of
the interquartile ranges of each party’s contingents.  The D-NOMINATE technique makes it
impossible to compare scores across chambers, but it is possible to compare the movement of
scores within each chamber across Congresses.  Note that the elections of 1810 and 1811
changed the ideological compositions of both chambers only slightly from the 11th to 12th
Congresses: the Senate became a little bit less anti-English and the House became a little more
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anti-English.  Therefore, it is inaccurate to conclude that the movement to war in 1812 was due to
a sea change in the ideological compositions of the two houses.
Next, note that ideological composition of the Senate foreign affairs committees.  The
Senate committee appointed in the second session (no single committee was appointed in the first
session to consider foreign affairs) had a much more pro-English cast than the Senate as a whole. 
While the composition of the committee moved against England in the third session, this much
smaller committee was at most representative of the Senate on the most pressing foreign policy
questions.  Upon convening in the Twelfth Congress, with the War Hawks in the House agitating
for war, the Senate appointed a select committee on relations with England and France that was
considerably more amenable to conciliation with England than even the Senate chamber as a
whole.  It was to this committee that most of the House-passed war measures was referred and,
not surprisingly, it was in this committee that so many measures languished, including the ultimate
declaration of war.  Once war had been declared, in the second session the Senate appointed a
staunchly anti-English committee to oversee the war’s conduct.
Evidence about the House Foreign Affairs committee’s composition is also graphed out in
Figure 4.  Unlike the Senate, the House committee was more anti-English than the whole chamber
throughout the Eleventh Congress.  Indeed, in the third session Speaker Varnum appointed a
select committee that was just as anti-English as the one Speaker Clay appointed in the first
session of the Twelfth Congress.  H nce, the stacking of the House Foreign Affairs committee
was not a War Hawk innovation, but a strategy that had been tried in the previous Congress.
The strong anti-English cast of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in the Twelfth
Congress is only part of the story about Clay’s construction of that committee.  Even though he
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14Hatzenbuehler’s (1972, 1976) two essays on the War Hawks, which are grounded in
quantitative roll call analysis, provide clear evidence of Porter’s questionable bona fides as a War
Hawk.  What Haztenbuehler does not do is move beyond the descriptive account that the roll call
record provides.  He does not, for instance, directly test the various committee stacking
hypotheses that exist in traditional historiography about the 12th Congress.
15In the reapportionment of 1811 New York gained seats in the House.  The legislature
chose to have two House members elected from Porter’s former district in the 13th Congress. 
Therefore Porter had two immediate successors.
appointed a comfortable anti-English majority onto the Foreign Affairs Committee, Clay also
appointed two Republicans who did not share their co-partisans’ revulsion toward England, along
with one Federalist who was outright pro-English.  
The two outlier Republicans are particularly noteworthy: The first was John Randolph,
easily the most hated Republican to the fire-breathers, who eventually led the effort to apply the
brakes in declaring war on England.  The second was Peter Porter, the chair of the committee,
who is often identified by historians as a fire-breathing War Hawk, by virtue of his position. 
Porter was in fact one of the least loyal Republicans on issues of foreign policy during the 12th
Congress, dutifully voting to declare war on England, but opposing the fire-breathers on other
matters (see Hatzenbuehler 1972, p. 377; 1976, p. 6).14  Porter's ambivalence about a war with
England was honestly acquired: He had begun his political life as a Federalist and represented a
district with Federalist leanings.  Porter’s support for war against England elicited strong
reactions from his constituents. Feeling the political heat, he declined to run for reelection, and
instead entered the military service during the War of 1812.  Porter’s successors in the House
from his upstate New York district, Samuel Hopkins and Nathaniel Howell, were both
Federalists.15
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16There is another misclassification in this story of the stacking of the Foreign Affairs
Committee, but in this case it comes on the other end of the ideological spectrum.  In relying on
traditional qualitative sources, historians have misidentified the position of Ebenezer Seaver, who
was the most ideologically-extreme Republican on the Foreign Affairs Committee.  Any argument
that Clay was stacking the Foreign Relations Committee in favor of war with England should
include Seaver as part of the pro-War bloc.  Seaver is missed as an ardent opponent of England
because of his demographic characteristics.  Being from Massachusetts, it is not likely that Seaver
went around in Clay’s social circles.  Because boarding house populations were at least as
geographically segregated as they were ideologically distinct (see Bogue and Marlaire, 1975), it is
unlikely that Seaver would have shown up in the famous “War Mess.”  And finally, because
Seaver had already served in the House for a decade, he is unlikely to be mentioned in the same
breath as Calhoun, Grundy, and the other first- and second-term fire-breathers that historians like
to write about.
With a more accurate understanding of Porter’s ambivalence about declaring war on
England, Clay’s political genius may even be clarified.  In addition to providing the Foreign
Affairs Committee with a strong anti-English majority, Clay also used the leadership of this
important committee to reach out to more moderate members of his party, in an attempt to
assemble a coalition in favor of his hardline agenda.  The final vote in favor of declaring war
illustrates the success of Clay’s tactic.16
One of the things that this analysis makes clear is that histories of Clay’s activities in
moving the country toward war in 1812 have failed to appreciate the opposition that Clay faced
from the Senate.  The Senate, like the House, contained a clear anti-English majority in both the
Eleventh and Twelfth Congresses.  Unlike the House, the Senate had weaker mechanisms to
convert policy majorities into policy.  It lacked a motion to cut off debate, as did the House.  But,
Clay’s first procedural move as Speaker was to change the House’s rules to add the motion for
the previous question.  Likewise, the Senate’s rules at that time provided for the appointment of
committees by ballot.  Balloting for committee allowed cohesive minorities to do better in setting
the composition of committees than if the majority party strictly controlled the appointment of
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17Even though the congressional literature has focused on the early evolution of the House
committee system, the abrupt transformation of the committee system in the S nate is eve more
committees.  Clay did not have to change the rules to be able to construct a clear anti-English
majority on the House’s Foreign Affairs committee.  Of course, neither did his predecessor,
Speaker Varnum, who also employed a similar committee-packing strategy himself.
Taken as a whole, then Clay’s activities as Speaker were aimed at reducing delay as much
as possible, rather than in manipulating agenda-setting mechanisms to coerce a reluctant House
into a war it did not want.  In his activities in changing the House rules, he was an architect,
insofar as he was the sponsor of the rule that most distinguishes the House from the Senate—the
motion for the previous question.  In his activities in stacking the Foreign Relations Committee,
he was a tactician, following the lead of Speakers before him who had also crafted committees to
his liking.
IV.  Clay and the Committee System
Recent scholarship about the development of the standing committee system in the early
nineteenth century has taken it as axiomatic that Henry Clay was the political figure around whom
the committee system’s transformation revolved.  This plausible assumption arises because of
Clay’s leadership of the War Hawks.  If there were only nine standing committees in the House
when Clay arrived in 1811 and twenty-four when he finally left in 1825, he must have been the
principal champion not only of using standing committees, but of manipulating them to achieve his
policy goals.
Because "Congress in committee is Congress at work," the remarkable transformation of
the congressional committee system in the early nineteenth century demands an accounting.17 
25
astounding.  Swift’s recent (1996) research on the early evolution of the Senate remarks (pp.
131–33) on the “big bang” in Senate committees in 1816 — the Senate added 11 legislative
standing committees to its 2 minor housekeeping committees in one fell swoop—but the
committee system itself is not her focus.  See Canon and Stewart (1998) for a recent review of
new statistical evidence about the transformation of the Senate committee during this era.
18Also see Rohde and Shepsle (1987) for the precursors to the Gamm-Shepsle argument.
Within the past decade, at least three explanations have emerged for the change that occurred in
the House, associated with Gerald Gamm and Kenneth Shepsle (1989), Jeffery A. Jenkins (1998),
and Randall Strahan (1994).  While each of these has important and subtle differences, they are
unified by at least one characteristic:  Speaker Henry Clay is the chief protagonist.
For Gamm and Shepsle, the supplanting of select with standing committees was related to
Speaker Clay's political situation.18  The end of the war with England removed the unifying
impulse of the ideologically-diverse Republicans.  The committee system amounted to a
convenient political stockpile that could be looted for Clay's advantage.  In particular, by shifting
legislative work from ad hoc select committees to more permanent standing committees, Clay
discovered how to distribute the work of the chamber to also shore up his political support.  He
relinquished to the new standing committees detailed control over legislation.  In return, he got
from his followers continued support for reelection as Speaker.
For Jenkins the logic of committee development is similar in spirit to Gamm and Shepsle's,
though different in particulars.  Jenkins takes note of Clay's presidential ambitions, suggesting that
by creating politically-valuable property rights in committee assignments and distributing those
rights widely throughout the chamber, Clay was essentially buying support within the House in his
quest for higher office.
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Finally, taking a fundamentally different route, Strahan suggests looking at Clay's
speakership in "political time."  By focusing on political time, Strahan argues that political
institutions periodically face critical moments (or crises) which are mostly defined by
developments outside the institutions themselves.  In these moments, institutions may have at their
helm either innovators or traditionalists.  The period surrounding the War of 1812 was one such
critical moment in congressional history.  Clay, an innovator, was endowed with certain legislative
skills and  je ne sais quoi.  He used his considerable political talents to seize control of the House,
transforming it in the process.
These accounts of and explanations for the transformation of the House committee system
in the early decades of the nineteenth century have been good starting points, but they have been
incomplete for at least two related reasons.  First, by focusing on Henry Clay they have tended to
overly personalize the transformation of the committee system during this era.  Clay was an
important player in the early institutional development of the House, but he was not alone, even
among his contemporaries.  Clay served in the House with 708 different men.  Some of
them—such as John C. Calhoun, John Quincy Adams, John Tyler, and Daniel Webster—are
remembered in American history books despite the fact that they served in the House.  Scores of
others were important national and regional politicians, adept at manipulating the electoral and
legislative mechanisms of their day.  Thus, it is certainly a mistake to overly-credit the political
ambitions and genius of a single individual when we could easily develop counterfactuals, with
others of Clay’s contemporaries taking the lead in his stead.
Stated another way, recent accounts of the evolution of the early House committee system
have tended to be “supply-driven,” with Clay providing entre into the benefits of a standing
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19The Congressional Serial Set (untitled, Serials 653–55, 32nd Con., 1st sess.) contains an
index to all private claims presented to the House from 1789 to 1851, including not only private
petitions but memorials, government reports, etc.  That three-volume set lists about 59,000
private claims submitted to the House during this period, or about 1,900 per Congress.  Because
they were not introduced as bills, these petitions do not show up in bill-based workload statistics,
even though a substantial fraction of the House was assigned to committees that processed these
claims.
committee system in return for political support.  There is likely a “demand-side” half of this story
which demands at least equal emphasis.
Second, virtually all accounts of the rise of standing committees seem to take a rather
simple view of House and, consequently, a simple view of how the standing committees were
used.  It is usually enough simply to note that the number of standing committees grew and, with
it, the amount of legislation considered by committees.  Yet, committees—then as now—were
useful for more than writing legislation.  They were convenient graveyards for bothersome
constituents claiming special government benefits.19  They formed a base for harassing executive
branch officials (White, 1951).  In the immortal words of David Mayhew (1974), they were used
to “take positions, take credit, and advertise.”  In the words of Richard Fenno (1974), they were
used to pursue “good public policy, power within the House, and reelection.” 
Many of the committees created during the “Clay years,” from the 12th to the 18th
Congress did not consider legislation at all, but were instead a way for the House to scrutinize the
actions of bureaucrats.  Some committees considered legislation of sweeping national importance. 
Others adjudicated disputes over land titles.  The transformation of the committee system that was
contemporary with Henry Clay did more than simply re-channel the flow of legislation within the
House.  It also provided new constituency service opportunities, on the one hand, and a new
capacity to affect the implementation of legislation, on the other.  Therefore, a full accounting of
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20It is also important to keep in sight the principal-agent relationship that is the core of
leader-follower dealings in the House.  Clay was a bold, new Speaker who took a more active
role in policymaking.  But he could not do it unilaterally:  he needed the support of the
membership, otherwise he would be voted out of power.  If he was a stronger leader than
previous speakers, then the membership must have wanted such (or at least showed a latent
demand that Clay recognized and exploited).  This point comes into sharper focus during periods
of Clay’s absence from the House, where the men chosen to be Speaker were perhaps less
talented, leading to more costly and less seamless institutional arrangements to organize the
House, and more legislative friction along the way.
why standing committees eventually dominated the organizational landscape of Congress must
appreciate the full range of uses to which legislative majorities can put their committees.
While it is true that Clay was a master parliamentarian who used the tools at his disposal
to the utmost, in extolling the virtues of Clay as an institutional innovator, it is important to keep
his contributions in perspective.20  In the case of the evolution of the committee system into one
dominated by standing committees, the drift in favor of standing committees began before Clay
assumed the speakership, made important gains during his occasional absences from the Speaker's
office, and did not reach equilibrium until Clay had left the House for good.
This point is illustrated by two figures that summarize the drift toward the use of standing
committees in the early years of the nineteenth century.  The first of these is Figure 5, which is a
time line that indicates when each of 24 standing committees was created in the House from 1800
to 1831.  To help orient our understanding of Clay’s participation in the creation of these
committees, I have also noted with thick black lines the periods when he was Speaker of the
House.
The time line prompts two preliminary remarks about the development of the committee
system during this time.  First, the lion's share of committees created in the House from 1800 to
1831 pertained to internal housekeeping matters, private claims, and military pensions. 
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21We can treat the division of the Commerce and Manufactures committee in two during
the 16th Congress as the creation of a single committee—Manufactures.  That is because
Manufactures was created in the opening days of the 16th Congress via a floor amendment to the
House rules in which the jurisdiction of the Commerce and Manufactures committee was left
unchanged.  Commerce and Manufactures had already been appointed, and none of the original
members of the Manufactures Committee was taken from Commerce and Manufactures.  Hence,
Commerce was considered the successor committee to Commerce and Manufactures.  
Committees overseeing significant policies of national scope were clearly in the minority.  Second,
while many new standing committees were created during the years of the Clay speakership, it is
important to note both what types of committees were created and which standing committees
were delayed in their creation during Clay’s leadership.  Of the 11 new committees created during
Clay's tenure, only two handled substantive policy — Manufactures and Agriculture.21  One of
these, Manufactures, was created via a motion from the floor when the committees were being
appointed in the early days of the 16th Congress.  The rest were either aimed at overseeing
expenditures within the executive branch (the six expenditure committees assigned to individual
agencies in the 14th Congress) or private claims.  
The motion to create a Committee on Manufactures provoked opposition from the chair
of Commerce and Manufactures and two supporting floor speeches that survive.  The yeas and
nays were not taken on the vote to amend the rules, but on a division the motion carried by a
88–60 (Annals, 16-1, pp. 708–10). The Annals and the Journal both report that the committee
was appointed immediately upon the passage of the resolution.  It is noteworthy that, using the D-
NOMINATE metric, the newly-constituted Manufactures Committee was a significant outlier on
second dimension, which Poole and Rosenthal report is associated with votes on the tariff during
the 16th Congress (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997, p. 49).  The Commerce Committee membership
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22Although some scholars treat the 17th Congress as a continuation of the Clay Era with a
Clay surrogate in the Speaker's chair, evidence from speakership elections in the 16th, 17th and
18th Congresses suggest otherwise (Lientz 1978, pp. 70–72).  When Clay left the House to attend
to business back home, it took three days and 22 ballots to choose a successor.  That succession
fight developed into a regional battle (the Missouri Compromise was the looming political issue),
tempered by regional politics and personal ambition.  In the end a fierce opponent of slavery
expansion, John W. Taylor (N.Y.), was elected Speaker.  The political center-of-gravity shifted in
the next Congress.  Taking two days and 12 ballots to settle matters, the Virginian Philip P.
Barbour eventually defeated Taylor for the speakership.  Clay returned to the House in the 18th
Congress, defeating Barbour for reelection, 139-42.  
Thus, over three Congresses the House deposed the incumbent speaker twice, electing in
turn a northerner, southerner, and westerner.  It is this sort of chaotic cycling, which also
manifested itself in legislating, that has given rise to the observation that no natural majority
existed in the House beginning in the late 1810s.
was uniformly distributed across the second dimension.  Hence, Clay stacked the committee once
it was created, but he was not clearly responsible for its creation.
Only one resolution was submitted during the Clay speakership to significantly expand the
number of standing committees with substantive legislative jurisdictions.  It died in the Rules
Committee (Annals,14-1, pp. 380–81; Harlow, 1917, pp. 215–16).  Thus, the most important
expansion of the standing committee system in the realm of substantive legislation occurred in the
17th Congress, when Clay was a thousand miles away from the House.22
As the number of standing committees grew, so, too, did the fraction of the House that
was assigned to them.  This is illustrated in Figure 6, which contains time series that show the
percentage of the House and Senate holding at least one select or standing committee assignment. 
Two trends stand out in these figures.  First, the fraction of the House assigned to at least one
standing committee rose at a steady clip throughout this entire period.  By comparison, changes in
the Senate came more abruptly.  Second, while the transformation of the House as a standing
committee-dominated legislative body continued under the speakership of Henry Clay, it was not
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until the 23rd Congress, during the Speakership of Andrew Stevenson, that standing committee
membership was finally universal.
While some scholars have described the committee system during the Clay speakership as
undergoing a sea change, it is not obvious that the changes wrought by Clay (or at least under the
sufferance of Clay) were entirely discontinuous.  If one desires a look at significant and abrupt
change in the congressional committee structure during the Clay years, the place to look is the
Senate, not the House.  At the very least, it is ironic that in a literature that claims to examine
Clay’s transformation of the system of  standing legislative committees, the most prominent
stories of his manipulating committees to his advantage are in his appointments to select
committees in the 12th Congress.
Consistent with Clay’s behavior preceding the War of 1812, his use of the committee
system during the 1810s more generally was one of tactician rather than architect.  He was
associated directly with no major reform of the committee system during his reign as Speaker. 
Others around Clay, fellow leaders and the rank-and-file, were the ones more interested in the
transformation of the committee system into one dominated by a small number of standing
committees with fixed jurisdictions.  And it was they, not Clay, who accomplished this important
work of institutional reform.
V.  Clay and the Two Missouri Compromises
On February 13, 1819, less than a month before the expiration of the 15th Congress, a bill reached
the House floor providing for the admission of Missouri to the Union.  During its consideration,
James Tallmadge, a rookie and lame duck congressman from New York, moved an amendment to
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prohibit the further introduction of slaves into the territory and to free those born in the territory
upon their twenty-fifth birthday.  When Tallmadge made his motion, few apparently realized that
before the month was out the old organization of national politics, which took much of its
structure from how elites thought America should respond in the face of the Napoleonic wars,
would be replaced with a new fundamental cleavage, organized regionally and taking most of its
energy from the slavery issue. Tallmadge's motion shifted the primary axis of political conflict in
Congress so that it became regional, leaving a second dimension that split North and South along
questions of internal improvements and the tariff. 
The central role of Henry Clay in eventually resolving the Missouri question marked him
as one of the leading spokesmen for national union, earning him the nickname “Great
Compromiser.”  Research into Clay’s activities over the two years in which the question was
burning makes it clear that he was a determined worker on behalf of compromise.  How did he
achieve this compromise?  Was it sheer skill as a legislative draftsman and coalition-builder?  Or
was Clay able to convert his powers as Speaker to his advantage?  The major powers at Clay’s
disposal were two:  first, the appointment of committees; second, the right of recognition.  In the
end, the many committees Clay had a hand in appointing were powerless in setting and controlling
the agenda on the Missouri question.  Thus Clay’s influence lay in his ability to push the issue to
the eve of adjournment, where the option of not acting at all proved unacceptable to a small
number of pivotal House members.
Even though the interjection of slavery into congressional debate brought national politics
to a high boil and upset established ideological coalitions, the House as an organization did not
disintegrate immediately.  Debate on the Talmmadge amendment in the 15th Congress quickly
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23Once the debate over Missouri ended, the House took up the bill to establish a Territory
of Arkansas out of the residual of the Missouri Territory not slated for statehood.  Here, John
Taylor moved the inclusion of the "Tallmadge Amendment" to the Arkansas bill, and the House
was off to debate the issue of slavery again.  Eventually the Arkansas Territory bill was signed
into law without having any slavery restrictions attached.
grew sharp and divisive, still proceedings on the Missouri statehood bill were expeditious in the
House.  Both sections of Tallmadge's amendment (prohibiting the importation of new slaves and
the emancipation of existing slaves at age 25) passed the House, 87 to 76 and 82 to 78, and the
bill was sent to the Senate in less than a week (Spann 1957, pp. 169–95).  The bill failed when the
conference report, which omitted the Tallmadge amendment, was rejected by the House (Journal,
15-2, pp. 335–39; Annals, 15-2, pp. 1436–38).23  The 15th Congress then adjourned.
Upon the opening of the 16th Congress, the Missouri question, and the new related
question about whether to admit Maine as a free state, hung over the Congress.  When the House
organized itself at the start of the 16th Congress, appointing the standing committees and typical
select committees, it also created two new selects, one to bring in a bill admitting Missouri, the
other for Maine (Journal, 16-1, pp. 18–19).  The next day the Missouri bill was reported back
almost immediately with no mention of slavery, and the furor began again.  John W. Taylor, a
Representative from New York who had spoken in favor of the Tallmadge amendment the
previous Congress, moved that the Missouri bill be tabled and that a select committee on the issue
of slavery in the territories be appointed (Journal, 16-1, p. 44; Annals, 16-1, pp. 732, 734–35). 
The Select Committee on Slavery in the Territories was unable to reach an agreement on whether
or how slavery should be restricted in the territories, prompting Taylor to ask for the committee
to be discharged on December 28, 1819 (Journal, 16-1, p. 82; Annals, 16-2, pp. 801–04).
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As Missouri and the slavery issue were being debated, the Select Committee on the
Admission of Maine was grinding along, finishing its work on December 21 (Journal, 16-1, p.
60).  Although the House eventually passed the Maine bill two weeks later, Clay was the first to
note publicly that the issue of Maine’s admission would likely be paired with Missouri’s in the
near future (Annals, 16-1, p. 841).  
With Maine out of the way for the moment, the House returned to the issue of Missouri
and slavery.  The House was in the midst of a renewed Missouri debate when the Maine bill,
having been amended to admit Missouri as well, arrived from the Senate on February 19, 1820. 
The House immediately took up the Senate bill, removed all mention of Missouri, sent the bill
back to the Senate, and then returned to work on the House Missouri bill again.  When word
reached the Senate of the House's action, the upper chamber asked for a conference committee,
which was granted (Annals, 16-1, p. 1558).  Deliberation on the Missouri bill still continued in the
House, even though a conference committee was working on a bill to admit both Maine and
Missouri.  For a short while, statehood politics had literally become a three-ring circus, with
separate statehood bills for Missouri and Maine still being debated in the House and Senate and a
conference committee trying to arrive at a compromise.
By early March, the House had passed a bill admitting Missouri with a prohibition of
slavery west of the Mississippi (this prohibition was termed the "Taylor amendment"), the Senate
had passed a bill admitting Missouri with a prohibition of slavery north of the 36" 30' parallel,
excepting Missouri (this form of the prohibition was labeled the "Thomas amendment"), and the
conference committee submitted a report that was essentially the Senate position on both slavery
and the Maine-Missouri linkage (Annals, 16-1, pp. 430, 472, 1572–73, 1576).    In the end,
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24Recall that even though Poole and Rosenthal report that their D-NOMINATE scores do
a relatively poor job of explaining how House members voted during this period, the issues that
the scores dopredict well are regional ones.  Therefore, it is reasonable to use the first dimension
as a measure of preferences for slavery restrictions.
enough erstwhile restrictionists in the House changed their votes to side with the Senate, so that
on March 3, 1820 the Missouri compromise, admitting Missouri and Maine and restricting slavery
above the 36" 30' parallel (excepting Missouri), was passed and sent to President Monroe for his
signature.  All that was left for Missouri to write a constitution and report back to Congress.
During the second session of the Fifteen Congress and the first session of the Sixteenth,
the House created four select committees, charging them with the task of crafting a statehood
compromise and reporting back to the House.  Under the rules of the House, this gave the
Speaker, Henry Clay, four chances to manipulate the agenda by his appointment of the
committees.  What course did Clay pursue in his committee appointments?  How successful were
these committees in achieving Clay’s goals?
Evidence of Clay’s appointment strategy is contained in the preferences of the members of
these select committees:  he stacked them with pro-slavery majorities.  Figure 7 illustrates the
array of ideological preferences represented on the committees appointed by Clay in the first
session of the Sixteenth Congress to consider the admission of Maine and Missouri, using the first
dimension of the D-NOMINATE scores to indicate members’ preferences for slavery
restrictions.24  Positive values are pro-restriction, negative values, anti-restriction.  Aside from the
Maine committee, each was dominated by pro-slavery forces.  Figure 7 also notes the location of
the House median on the D-NOMINATE scale.  Unlike the committees, the House majorities
were moderately pro-restrictionist.  Therefore, it is not surprising that each time one of the
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committees reported a bill without a slavery restriction, it was rolled by the floor, which added the
strongest versions of slavery restrictions then under consideration.  The only pro-slavery
committee that prevailed was not a select committee, but the final conference committee, which
operated under special rules that allowed it to offer the House a take-it-or-leave-it proposition:  a
weak restriction or no bill at all.  Only then could the restriction most palatable to southerners
pass, presumably because the pivotal restrictionist preferred a weak form of slavery restrictions to
protracted debate over Missouri and the uncertainty that would have flowed from that.
After the completion of the first session of the 16th House, Clay resigned from the
speakership, unable to the maintain this position because of  financial problems brought on by the
Panic of 1819 (Peterson 1987, pp. 66–68; Remini 1991, pp.176–77; cf. Adams 1875, vol. V, p.
59).  It appears that Clay favored John W. Taylor as a successor, figuring that the Missouri
question was behind the House and that Taylor was the most able House leader on the issue of the
protective tariff—which interested Clay more than slavery restrictions (Ravenal 1901, pp.
208–209; Spann 1957, p. 224).
The battle to replace Clay at the start of the second session rapidly became structured
along regional lines.  Taylor emerged as the predominant northern candidate, but support was
sufficiently split among others that repeated balloting proved inconclusive.  After two days and 22
ballots, Taylor was eventually elected Speaker by a margin of one vote.  Critical to Taylor's
election was support from the “Bucktail” (anti-Clinton) faction from his home state, which had
been a major source of northern opposition to Taylor in the early balloting, but which eventually
swung to Taylor after he pledged to Bucktail supporters his neutrality in New York politics
(Annals 16-2, pp. 434–38; Spann 1960, p. 384; Leintz 1978, pp. 69–71).
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Clay’s earlier prediction that Missouri was behind the House—and that Taylor therefore
was a safe successor—proved immediately wrong.  As soon as Taylor was elevated to the
speakership, the House received the Missouri constitution, which included a provision excluding
freed Blacks from entering the new state.  The Missouri constitution rekindled debates that many
had thought had been put to rest only a few months before.  The presidential election of 1820 only
stoked the flames higher: With the Missouri constitution the center of congressional debate, a
constitutional crisis was nearly created over the question of whether Missouri's electoral votes
should be counted (Peterson 1987, p. 64; Remini 1991, p. 188–90)
Preoccupation with the Missouri constitution ground virtually all other lawmaking to a
halt.  Immediately upon receiving the Missouri Constitution, Taylor appointed a three-person
committee to examine it and report to the House.  Consisting of two moderate slavery
expansionists (William Lowndes of South Carolina and Samuel Smith of Maryland) and one
moderate restrictionist (John Sergeant of Pennsylvania), the committee split on the propriety of
restricting the movement of free Blacks into Missouri (Annals, 16-2, p. 440).  The report back
was only a prelude to a three-month debate.
As the debate stretched into January and toward February, patience began to wear thin. 
Clay, who had been absent from the House all this session, returned in late January and was
immediately drawn into efforts to extricate the House from endless debate (Brown 1926, pp.
35–43, 65; Peterson 1987, pp. 62–66; Remini 1991, p. 185).  Now a rank-and-file member, Clay
stepped into the leadership position on Missouri.  Adopting a similar tack to the one he had
attempted as Speaker, Clay moved that the resolution admitting Missouri be referred to a select
committee.  The House complied and Taylor proceeded to appoint 13 representatives to the
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25The first 12 elected to the committee had an average first dimension D-NOMINATE
score of -0.207, compared to the next 11 whose average was 0.216  (t=4.74).  Remini (p. 190)
reports that Clay circulated a list of names beforehand, indicating whom he desired to serve on the
committee, selecting from a list that Clay had prepared (Spann 1957, p. 241; Remini 1991, p.
187).  Unlike the earlier committees on Missouri that Clay had a role in appointing, this one was a
surprisingly faithful mirror image of the entire House.  Still, the relationship between Clay's
committee and the floor was similar to past efforts.  The committee recommended the acceptance
of the Missouri constitution, on the condition that the Missouri legislature pledge "by solemn
public act ... never to pass any law preventing any description of persons from coming to or
settling in said State, who are or hereafter may become citizens of any State of this Union"
(Annals, 16-2, p. 1080).  However, the restrictionists on the committee were all indisposed
toward the proviso, favoring instead a rejection of the Missouri constitution altogether.  The
proviso favored by the select committee was interpreted by northern restrictionists as a victory for
the south, and it was defeated by a close vote, 82 to 88 (Annals, 16-2, p. 1146).
The session dragged on with no resolution to whether Missouri "was a river, an Indian
tribe, a territory, or a state" (Spann 1957, p. 240).  Finally, Clay moved again to appoint a
committee on the Missouri question, this time as a joint committee with the Senate, referred to as
the “Committee on Compromise.”  The House acceded to this request, with the House members
this time selected by ballot (Spann 1957, p. 244; Remini 1991, pp. 190–91). The pattern of the
ballot suggests that the slavery expansionists were more united in their preferences for joint
committee members than restrictionists, since the ranking of the committee (which was based on
number of ballots received) tended to have expansionists on the top and restrictionists on the
bottom (Annals, 16-2, pp. 1219–20).25  However, the overall membership of the committee again
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committee.  Although Remini—citing other sources in support of this view—takes this to be
indicative of the wide-ranging support within the House for a resolution to the contest, its
sectarian cast is still betrayed by the fact that pro-slavery elements still resided at the top of the
committee as it was finally chosen.  Furthermore, simple quantitative analysis reveals that the
101–55 vote to support the naming of this committee was strongly structured along ideological
lines—ardent restrictionists opposed it, ardent pro-slavery Representatives supported it, and the
middle of the ideological space was moderately supportive.  Thus, while a majority was being
built in favor of a compromise on Missouri, it simply is not the case that the “growing temper of
the representatives to resolve the problem” (Remini, p. 191) was universal.
closely mirrored that of the House.  And yet again, the committee recommended the admission of
Missouri under essentially the same conditions that the House had rejected before.  This time,
under the pressure of adjournment, the bill passed, 87–81 (Annals, 16-2, p. 1239).  
According to Spann (1957), whose study of Speaker Taylor’s actions during the Missouri
debate constitutes the most extensive institutional analysis of the controversy, the House agreed
to the eventual passage of  the Missouri resolution because "the House was now ready to vote for
almost anything and ... rushed it through..." (p. 245).  In fact, the two votes on Missouri's
constitution were virtually identical, and thus closure on the Missouri question did not come
through the wholesale conversion of House members.  Nine House votes, out of a membership of
186, shifted over the course of the debate on whether to accept the Missouri constitution—five
were originally abstentions and four had been restrictionists.  
Spann’s interpretation of the outcome of the final vote is correct in noting the importance
of one strategic detail, however:  The final vote on Missouri was held 5 days before the Sixteenth
Congress adjourned.  Failure to resolve Missouri’s status in the Union threatened western
violence and continued secessionist rhetoric from the South.  Thus, just like the end of the first
session, closure on the Missouri issue in the second came not because a committee had induced
stability to a chaotic debate—looming adjournment was what mattered.
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Yet again, Clay’s behavior during the Missouri controversy saw him operate in a formal
setting of rules and committees, and in a more rough-and-tumble tactical setting of trying to work
a political coalition so that a small number of pivotal voters came his way.  Using what was by
now a well-worn strategy of stacking committees, Clay was a failure.  Clay was much more
successful, however, in using the flow of the legislative calendar—in particular, the deep, dark
night of adjournment—to his advantage.
VI.  Discussion and Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been two-fold.  First, I have attempted to supplement traditional
historiography about the legislative legacy of Henry Clay through the use of political science data
and analytical techniques.  Doing so casts some new light on the legislative moments in the House
that have been closely associated with Clay.  The research of Poole and Rosenthal, and their
construction of estimated ideal points, allows us to understand more precisely when and how Clay
attempted to stack committees to his advantage.  Clay, it turns out, was a committee stacker.  He
did not invent the practice, however, nor was he especially successful when he did it.
At one level, why Clay was unsuccessful is made clear when we apply another technique
of modern legislative analysis to his behavior:  rational choice analysis, and particularly the spatial
voting variant.  Students of legislatures who study committee-floor interactions always want to
know two things about the rules governing these interactions:  First, does the committee have
gate keeping power?  Second, can the committee report legislation under a closed rule?  In other
words, can a committee keep off the floor policy proposals in its legislative domain that a majority
of the committee disapproves of, and if a proposal makes it to the floor, can the committee
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restrict amendments to its proposals?  For the period when Clay was Speaker, committees in both
chambers had virtually no closed rule authority.  The only exception was conference
committees—an important exception to which I will return. They had limited gate keeping
authority, however, and right of first proposal.
Clay appeared most successful in stacking committees in the Twelfth Congress.  What
Clay was wrestling with in this Congress was not the problem of protecting an anti-English
majority on the floor—the House was overwhelmingly anti-English.  The problem was delay, both
within the House and in the Senate.  On the House side, his biggest prospective headache was
John Randolph and his followers, who were growing sophisticated in their use of delaying tactics
on the floor.  Thus, the passage of the previous question motion at the start of the Twelfth
Congress was an important parliamentary innovation aimed at stemming the sort of delay they had
pioneered in the Eleventh Congress.  On the Senate side, Clay’s biggest worry was the prospect
that the Senate would appoint weak-willed committees, unwilling to report pro-war measures. 
His experience as a senator in the third session of the Eleventh Congress acquainted him first-
hand with this problem, and the Senate behaved no differently at the start of the Twelfth
Congress.  Although Clay could not directly influence the appointment and activity of the Senate
committees, he had it in his power to construct House committees that were dedicated to acting
quickly.  On the margin, he also used a few appointment in an attempt to broaden the base of
support in the House for war with England.  In the end, Clay’s tactical genius in the Twelfth
Congress was aimed not at moving a reluctant Congress to war, but in overcoming the ability of
the minority to delay.
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Later on, Clay was less favored substantively, and so his committee-stacking often came
to naught.  A majority of the House was moderately restrictionist toward slavery during the
Missouri question, and there was no way that the recommendation of a regular House committee
to strip Missouri statehood bills of their restrictionist content would prevail, as is evident from
what actually transpired.  Here, Clay used to his advantage a feature of legislative life that is often
overlooked by legislative scholars, with the notable exception of Baron and Ferejohn (1989):  the
costs of legislative delay.  When the House was offered the alternatives of Missouri without
slavery versus Missouri with slavery, a majority always chose Missouri without slavery, and there
was nothing in the agenda-setting powers of various select committees that could alter that fact. 
But, when the House was offered the alternatives of Missouri with limited slavery versus potential
armed conflict during the congressional recess, a small number of House members switched,
changing the outcome.  Whether Clay consciously sought delay on the Missouri question until the
end of the two sessions is unclear, but what is clear is that delay worked to Clay’s advantage in
these cases.
The second purpose of this paper has been to assess more broadly the nature of Clay’s
contribution to the institutional development of the House.  In this review, the bottom-line
conclusion seems clear:  Clay was a brilliant and dogged tactician, but not an institutional
architect.  Others in the House served the architectural role.  Unfortunately, none of them shone
as brightly in the antebellum firmament as Clay, and therefore we may never know, with any
satisfaction, the details of why the House evolved as it did.
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Figure 1.  D-NOMINATE scores of Henry Clay, 16th, 22nd–27th, and 31st Congresses.
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Figure 2.  Roll call votes in the House, 1st–32nd Congress (1789–1853).
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Figure 3.  D-NOMINATE coordinates, first dimension, for members of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, 12th Cong., 1st sess.
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Figure 4.  Comparison of ideological (D-NOMINATE) locations of House and Senate members
of foreign affairs committees, 11th and 12th Congresses.
Figure 5.  Time line of House committee creation, 1800 – 1831.
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
Congress
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
P
ct
.
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
Congress
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
P
ct
.
House
Senate
a.  Select committees
b.  Standing committees
Figure 6.  Percentage of House and Senate members holding at least one standing and select
committee assignment, 1789–1855.
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Figure 7.  First dimension D-NOMINATE scores of Missouri committees appointed in the first
session of the 16th Congress.
Table 1.  D-NOMINATE scores of House members with service both before the 13th Congress
and after the 25th.
Avg. scores before the 13th
Cong. (s.d.)
Avg. scores after the 25th
Cong. (s.d.)
Party before the
13th Cong.
Party after the
25th Cong
n Dimension 1Dimension 2 Dimension 1Dimension 2
Rep. Whig 7 0.10
(0.40)
-0.06
(0.29)
0.26
(0.07)
0.04
(0.20)
Rep. Dem. 7 -0.21
(0.17)
-0.08
(0.10)
-0.34
(0.14)
0.03
(0.20)
Fed. Whig 4 0.18
(0.34)
0.04
(0.14)
0.49
(0.04)
-0.08
(0.15)
